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The Macroeconomics of Oil Shocks
During the first quarter of 2002, 
the price of crude oil averaged $19.67 
per barrel.  Four years later, in the first 
quarter of 2006, the average price of 
oil had risen to $63 per barrel.   In-
deed, the high price of oil may not be a 
short-lived phenomenon: Futures mar-
kets indicate that investors expect the 
price of oil to remain above $70 per 
barrel through 2008.  For the postwar 
U.S. economy, the data show a clear 
tendency for oil-price spikes to precede 
or various reasons, oil-price increases may 
lead to significant slowdowns in economic 
growth. Five of the last seven U.S. recessions 
were preceded by significant increases in 
the price of oil. In this article, Keith Sill examines the 
effect of changes in oil prices on U.S. economic activity, 
focusing on how runups in the price of oil can affect 
output growth and inflation. He also discusses the 
channels by which oil-price increases might affect the 
economy and the historical evidence on the relationship 
between oil prices, economic growth, and inflation.
economic downturns.  Though most 
of these episodes occurred at a time 
when oil’s share as an input into U.S.
production was larger than it is today, 
there is still much debate about how 
oil prices affect the economy.  How 
concerned should we be about the 
economic consequences of persistently 
high oil prices?   
Oil prices matter for the economy 
in several ways. Changes in oil prices 
directly affect transportation costs, 
heating bills, and the prices of goods 
made with petroleum products.  Oil-
price spikes induce greater uncertainty 
about the future, which may lead to 
firms’ and households’ delaying pur-
chases and investments. Changes in 
oil prices also lead to reallocations 
of labor and capital between energy-
intensive sectors of the economy and 
those that are not energy-intensive.  
For these reasons and others, oil-
price increases may lead to significant 
slowdowns in economic growth. In
the postwar U.S. data, the correlation 
between oil-price spikes and economic 
downturns is not perfect — some 
oil-price increases are not followed 
by recessions.  But five of the last 
seven U.S. recessions were preceded 
by significant increases in the price of 
oil.  The most recent rise in the price 
of oil has not led (at least not yet) to 
an economic recession, but history 
nonetheless suggests that oil prices are 
an important element in assessing the 
economy’s near-term prospects.    
OIL PRICES
From the late 1940s to the early 
1970s, the price of oil was very stable, 
moving up only slightly.1 From the ear-
ly 1970s to the early 1980s, the price 
of oil rose dramatically in a sequence 
of steps associated with the rise of 
OPEC and disruptions in the supply of 
oil from the Middle East oil-producing 
countries (Figure 1).2
1From 1948 to 1972, the price of oil produced 
in the U.S. was influenced by the production 
quotas set by the Texas Railroad Commission 
(TRC). Each month, the TRC (and other state 
regulatory agencies like it) made forecasts of 
petroleum demand for the upcoming month and 
set production quotas to meet the forecasted 
demand.  Since the quantity of oil produced was 
adjusted to meet forecasted demand, the price 
of oil remained fairly stable. However, in the 
face of growing world demand for oil relative 
to supply, and the peaking of U.S. domestic oil 
production in 1970, the TRC set the production 
quotas at 100 percent in March 1971.
2The Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) was formed in 1960 with 
five founding members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. By the end of 
1971, Qatar, Indonesia, Libya, the United Arab 
Emirates, Algeria, and Nigeria had joined. OPEC first experienced the power 
it had over the price of oil during the 
Yom Kippur War, which started in 
October 1973.  As a result of U.S. and 
European support of Israel, OPEC
imposed an oil embargo on western 
countries. Oil production was cut by 5 
million barrels a day (though about 1 
million barrels a day in production was 
made up by other countries). The cut-
back amounted to about 7 percent of 
world production, and the price of oil 
increased 400 percent in six months.  
From 1974 to 1978 crude-oil prices 
were relatively stable, ranging from $12 
to $14 per barrel. The next big round 
of oil-price increases came with the 
Iranian revolution and Iran-Iraq war 
in 1979 and 1980. World production 
fell 10 percent, and this resulted in the 
price of oil rising from $14 to $35 per 
barrel. However, the high price of oil 
was leading consumers and firms to 
conserve energy. Homeowners insu-
FIGURE 1
Nominal Price of Crude Oil
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lated their houses.  Commuters bought 
more fuel-efficient cars.  Firms bought 
equipment that was more energy ef-
ficient.  High oil prices also led to 
increased exploration and production 
of oil from countries outside of OPEC.  
From 1982 to 1985 OPEC sought 
to stabilize the price of oil through 
production quotas, but conservation 
efforts, a global recession, and cheat-
ing on production quotas by OPEC
members eventually led to a plummet-
ing of oil prices to below $10 per barrel 
by 1986.3
Since the mid-1980s the frequency 
of oil-price changes has been much 
greater than in the past. OPEC contin-
ued to influence the price using pro-
duction quotas, but it has been unable 
to stabilize it. In fact, OPEC’s share of 
world oil production has fallen from a 
peak of 55 percent in 1973 to about 42 
percent today. U.S. imports of oil from 
OPEC, as a share of total petroleum 
imports, peaked at 70.3 percent in 
1977 and have since fallen to about 43 
percent.4 Today, the major suppliers of 
imported oil for the U.S. are Canada 
and Mexico, followed by Saudi Arabia 
and Venezuela.     
Oil Prices, Recessions, and 
Inflation. We can plot the real price 
of oil, that is, the price of oil adjusted 
for inflation, the rate of inflation as 
measured by the consumer price index 
(CPI), and U.S. recessions as defined 
by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (Figure 2). The figure indi-
cates that even with the substantial 
runup in the nominal price of oil 
since 1999, oil remains cheaper, in 
real terms, than it was during the late 
1970s.    
A striking aspect of the postwar 
history of oil prices and the economy 
is that oil prices spike upward right 
around the time of recessions. A clear 
relationship between oil prices and 
inflation is harder to discern. During 
some episodes, such as 1973-74 and 
1980, it appears that inflation rises at 
the same time that the price of oil
rises. At other times, such as 2002 to 
the present, oil prices rise while infla-
tion remains stable. The figure suggests 
that the relationship between oil-price 
increases and the real economy might 
be stronger than the relationship be-
tween oil prices and inflation.  
A characteristic of the oil-price 
spikes that occur around recessions 
is that they tend to be both large and 
3 Over the period 1982-86, Saudi Arabia 
acted as the marginal oil producer, cutting its 
production in an effort to keep oil prices from 
falling. In August 1982, the Saudis abandoned 
that strategy and linked their oil price to the 
spot market for crude.  
4 U.S. oil production peaked at 9.6 million 
barrels a day in 1970 and has since fallen to 
about 5.4 million barrels a day. Even at that 
rate, the U.S. remains one of the world’s largest 
oil producers. In fact, only Saudi Arabia and 
Russia produce more oil in a year than the U.S.

















































































































































































Dollars / Barrelabrupt. By abrupt, we mean that the 
price changes are sharp upward move-
ments rather than slow and gradual 
upward drifts. Historically, the pre-
recession spikes are associated with 
disruptions in supply from the Middle 
East. These supply disruptions tend 
to be associated with wars that led to 
significant reductions in the amount 
of oil exports by the affected countries 
(see the table). The table shows that 
Middle East conflicts led to rather 
large reductions in the world supply 
of oil. Absent a large drop in demand, 
such large supply disruptions could 
lead to large increases in the world 
price of oil. The table confirms that 
U.S. business-cycle peaks also tended 
to occur close in time to the dates of 
the conflicts. Note, though, that the 
length of time between the oil-supply 
disruption and the business-cycle peak 
varies, ranging from about contem-
poraneously to a little over one year.  
What the table and Figure 2 by them-
selves cannot tell us is whether oil-
price increases or Middle East conflicts 
or some other factor, such as monetary 
policy, led to recessions in 1957, 1973, 
1980-81, and 1990. However, the data 
suggest the possibility of a link be-
tween oil and the macroeconomy.   
WHY MIGHT OIL-PRICE SPIKES 
CAUSE RECESSIONS?
Is it plausible that an increase 
in the price of oil leads to recession 
when oil represents such a small (and 
declining) share of U.S. output? Oil 
consumption as a share of gross domes-
tic output (GDP) was slightly below 4.5 
percent in the early 1970s, but it has 
since declined steadily to a little over 2 
percent in 2004 (Figure 3).5 How could 
a change in the price of an input that 
represents such a small share of the 
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FIGURE 2
Real Oil Price & CPI Inflation
5Oil consumption is measured using the Energy 
Information Administration’s data on U.S. total 
crude oil and petroleum products supplied to 
U.S. households, firms, and government.
economy have such a dramatic eco-
nomic effect?
Oil prices affect the economy 
through a multitude of channels. 
When all of these effects are added up, 
oil prices could have a larger impact 
than what might be expected from oil’s 
small share in the economy. The key 
is that oil-price changes affect both 
supply and demand. Changes in oil 
prices affect supply because they make 
it more costly for firms to produce 
goods; they affect demand because 
they influence wealth and can induce 
uncertainty about the future.
First, let’s consider this: An oil-
price increase acts like a tax on firms 
and households. The United States 
imports a large fraction of the oil it 
uses from other countries, and the pay-
ments we make to foreign countries for 
oil represent an outflow of funds from 
the U.S.  Higher payments to foreign-
ers for oil reduce income available for 
spending on other goods and services. 
The lower demand for domestically 
produced goods and services might 
mean lower production of goods and 
services. The demand effect is stronger 
if the foreign countries to which we 
make payments for oil do not trade 
much with the U.S. That means that 
the dollars spent on oil do not get re-
cycled to the U.S. economy in the form 
of foreign purchases of U.S. goods and 
services.6
A second channel by which a 
jump in the price of oil can reduce out-
put growth comes from the manner in 
which energy and capital, such as ma-
chines, are used in production. Energy 
and capital are largely complements 
in production, which means that to 




















































































































































































6However, dollars may get recycled back to 
the U.S. economy if petroleum-producing 
countries purchase U.S. assets. Such purchases 
could drive down U.S. interest rates and boost 
consumption and investment. 24 Q1 2007 Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
run machines you need energy, and to 
run machines more intensively takes 
more energy. If energy becomes more 
expensive, firms may have to purchase 
new energy-efficient machines if they 
want to maintain profit margins. Firms 
stuck with less fuel-efficient machines 
see their profit margins suffer, and 
so they may invest less in capital and 
labor. Firms may also delay or change 
their investment plans in response to 
a rise in the price of oil. These various 
investment factors slow both demand 
in the economy as a whole and the 
economy’s rate of output growth.  
In addition, oil-price changes 
might have reallocative effects on the 
economy. Some sectors use energy 
more intensively than others. For ex-
ample, the transportation sector is a 
heavy user of petroleum products com-
pared with the trade sector. When the 
price of oil rises,  the transportation 
sector is affected relatively more, lead-
ing to flows of capital and labor out of 
transportation and into other sectors 
of the economy. This labor and capital 
reallocation has a short-term negative 
Source: Hamilton (2003). The table lists the major Middle East conflicts since 1950, the amount by which the conflict reduced the world supply of oil, 
and the number of months to the onset of the nearest U.S. recession.
TABLE





from Disruption to 
Cycle Peak
Nov. 1956 Suez Crisis 10.1% Aug. 1957 8
Nov. 1973 Yom Kippur War 7.8% Nov. 1973 0
Nov. 1978 Iranian Revolution 8.9% Jan. 1980 13
Oct. 1980 Iran-Iraq War 7.2% July 1981 8
Aug. 1990 Persian Gulf War 8.8% July 1990 -1
effect on output as unemployed and 
underemployed resources seek new 
uses. 
Empirical studies have attempted 
to quantify the extent of reallocation 
in response to changes in the price 
of oil.  Research by Steven Davis and 
John Haltiwanger found that oil-price 
increases account for about 20 to 25 
percent of the variability of employ-
ment growth in the manufacturing 
sector. Furthermore, firms that had 
higher capital intensity and higher 
energy intensity made greater adjust-
ments to their workforces in response 
to oil-price increases.  
Oil-price increases may also lead 
consumers and firms to delay their 
purchases of certain types of goods. 
For example, a household may decide 
that it wants to purchase an SUV.  If
oil prices jump up, the household 
might decide to hold off on the pur-
chase until it becomes clearer how 
long-lasting the oil price increase is 
likely to be. Similarly, firms may delay 
investing in certain types of equipment 
until uncertainty about the future 
price of oil is somewhat resolved. Thus, 
whether an oil-price hike is perceived 
as temporary — lasting only a month 
or two — or long-lasting can poten-
tially have a significant impact on 
spending decisions by consumers and 
businesses.    
The Asymmetric Effect of Oil-
Price Changes.  How can we pin 
down the link between oil prices and 
the macroeconomy?  As we saw in 
Figure 2, some oil-price increases could 
lead to recessions. What about oil-
price decreases? Do they lead to faster 
output growth? Interestingly enough, 
the answer is no. A significant feature 
of the empirical relationship between 
oil prices and real output is that oil 
prices have an asymmetric effect on 
output: Oil-price increases slow output 
growth, but oil-price decreases do not 
boost output growth.   
A possible reason behind this 
asymmetric effect of oil prices on 
growth is the interaction of the sup-
ply, demand, and reallocation effects. 
Rising oil prices affect supply because 
firms now find it more expensive to Business Review Q1 2007 25 www.philadelphiafed.org
produce goods because of higher en-
ergy costs. Demand may be affected 
as well, since consumers and firms are 
likely to be uncertain about how long 
oil prices will remain high and what 
the implications are for investment 
and purchases of durable goods. Both 
of these factors decrease real output. 
In addition, the reallocation of re-
sources across sectors of the economy 
in response to higher oil prices slows 
economic growth.
Now consider what happens when 
oil prices fall.  Again, there is a sup-
ply effect: Firms now find it cheaper 
to produce goods, which encourages 
increased production.  Lower oil prices 
are likely to increase demand as well. 
But the reallocation effect still slows 
growth as resources move across sec-
tors in response to lower oil prices. On
net, all of these factors may wash out, 
so that the effect of a decrease in the 
price of oil is just about nil. This might 
FIGURE 3
Share of Oil Consumption in GDP
explain the asymmetric effect of oil-
price changes on the economy.
The asymmetric effect of oil-price 
shocks on output growth is key to 
understanding a second prominent 
feature of the link between oil and 
the macroeconomy: The relationship 
between oil-price changes and real 
output growth is much stronger before 
1985 compared with after 1985.7 Before 
1985, there is strong statistical evi-
dence that oil-price changes predicted 
real output growth. After 1985, this 
relationship breaks down. What has 
happened?
Recall from Figure 2 that before 
1980, large changes in the price of oil 
were upward.  If increases in oil prices 
lead to slower economic growth (asym-
metry), the pre-1980 data contain 
many instances of oil-price increases 
to examine that hypothesis.  Indeed, 
before 1980, there is a strong predic-
tion that oil-price increases lead to 
slower growth.  After 1980, oil-price 
changes are both positive and negative. 
If only positive oil-price changes affect 
economic growth, all of the negative 
price changes in the data make it 
more difficult to uncover the effect of 
oil-price changes on output, since the 
negative price changes would attenu-
ate the measured effect of the positive 
price changes. The net result of the 
asymmetric effect of oil-price increases 
coupled with lots of oil-price decreases 
in the data after 1985 would lead to 
a much weaker measured relation-
ship between oil prices and economic 
growth.
Of course, just because oil-price 
increases appear to predict slower real 
output growth does not mean that oil-
price increases cause slower real out-
put growth. It could be the case that 
when the economy is strong and real 
output growth is high, resulting high 
demand for oil pushes up the price of 
oil. (When the economy weakens and 
demand for oil slows, there is down-
ward pressure on the price of oil.) This 
type of feedback from the economy 
to oil prices could end up looking a 
lot like oil-price increases causing re-
cessions, even though it is really the 
economy that is driving up oil prices, 
because oil prices would be high prior 
to a slowdown in growth. If we want to 
understand whether oil-price increases 
actually cause recessions, we have to 
control for the feedback effect of the 
economy and demand on oil prices. 
OIL-PRICE INCREASES CAUSED 
BY EXTERNAL FACTORS
Research by James Hamilton 
discusses the problem of feedback from 
the economy to oil prices and poses a 
solution. If we want to control for the 





























































7Economists use the term shock to refer to 
unanticipated changes in economic variables. 
Examples include unanticipated changes 
in monetary and fiscal policy, extreme 
environmental conditions, and events that alter 
the world price of energy.feedback from real output growth to 
oil prices, we should identify jumps in 
the price of oil that are not caused by 
U.S. economic conditions.8 That is, we 
want to identify oil-price increases that 
are external to U.S. economic condi-
tions and then investigate whether 
these oil-price increases caused by 
external factors predict slower output 
growth.9 We can then plausibly argue 
that since those oil-price increases are 
not a result of U.S. economic condi-
tions, any relationship between these 
price increases and slower real output 
growth is in the direction from oil-
price increases to real output growth. 
This would be a key piece of evidence 
in arguing that oil-price increases can 
lead to economic downturns. 
How can we find external oil-price 
increases in the data? Recall from the 
table that Middle East conflicts have 
historically been associated with oil-
price increases. It can reasonably be 
argued that these conflicts were not 
an immediate result of U.S. economic 
conditions. That is, the overall state of 
the U.S. economy at the time did not 
influence the unfolding of the Middle 
East conflicts and the associated rise 
in oil prices listed in the table.  Hamil-
ton has argued that these conflicts can 
indeed be thought of as external to the 
U.S. economy, and so they can be used 
to measure a causal effect of oil-price 
shocks on output growth. Statistical 
analysis that examines the effect of 
these external episodes that led to 
oil-price increases finds that these epi-
sodes do precede economic slowdowns.   
This evidence argues that oil-price in-
creases cause slower output growth.  
10 In his 2004 article, Hamilton argues that the 
net oil-price increase over a 36-month period 
has good statistical properties and summarizes 
well a complicated nonlinear link between oil 
prices and real output growth.
11 The quarterly measure of a net oil-price 
increase is constructed by averaging the 
monthly net oil-price increase series.
Of course, there are many more 
oil-price increases in the data than just 
the five or so associated with Middle 
East conflicts. Researchers have used 
a variety of methods to isolate the im-
portant oil-price changes for predicting 
real output growth. One early method 
was to use only oil-price increases in 
statistical analyses and ignore oil-price 
decreases. However, researchers have 
subsequently found that more sophis-
ticated measures of oil-price increases 
have a more stable relationship with 
real output growth.  In particular, a 
measure of the net increase in oil price is 
often used.  This series is constructed 
as follows: Compare oil prices in the 
current period with the highest oil 
price over a previous period, say, the 
last 36 months. If the current price is 
higher than the preceding 36-month 
peak, calculate the percentage differ-
ence between the two. If the current 
price is lower than the preceding 36-
month peak, set the series to zero. This 
measure of net oil-price increases, in 
effect, says that if the current price of 
oil is increasing only because it is mov-
ing back up to a previous peak (over 
the last three years), we don’t expect 
it to have an effect on real output 
growth. However, if the current price 
is higher than it has been over the last 
three years, we can expect an effect on 
real output growth.10
Figure 4 shows that the net in-
crease in oil prices, measured quarterly, 
tends to rise significantly before U.S.
recessions, and this series does a good 
job of picking up the price movements 
associated with the Middle East con-
flicts reported in the table.11 Note that 
this series is quite often zero. In fact, 
from the early 1950s until the end of 
2004, there are about 700 months of 
data. But in only about 75 of those 
months is the net oil-price increase 
positive; the rest of the time it is zero. 
By this measure, oil shocks are fairly 
infrequent events.  In his 2004 ar-
ticle, Hamilton demonstrates that net 
oil-price increases basically capture 
the historical tendency of the U.S.
economy to do poorly after the five 
major Middle East conflicts listed in 
the table. 
So far, we have talked about the 
effect of oil prices on the economy. 
However, we could alternatively look 
directly at the quantity of oil produced 
each year and ask how changes in the 
world supply of oil affect the economy. 
Lutz Kilian, in a 2006 working paper, 
did just that. He examined data on 
the quantity of oil produced by the 
world’s suppliers, focusing principally 
on suppliers from the Middle East. To 
develop a series of data on the effects 
of external shocks on oil quantities, 
Kilian posed the question of what oil 
production would have been had a 
country not experienced a conflict 
such as a war.  The difference between 
the amount of oil a country would 
have produced had there been no 
conflict and the quantity that was 
produced during the conflict gives 
a measure of supply shortfall that is 
external to developments in the U.S.
economy (Figure 5). The Middle East 
supply disruptions listed in the table 
show up as large downward movements 
in the quantity of oil. As with the net 
oil-price series, we see that dramatic 
movements in the series preceded U.S.
recessions. In this case, it is a dramatic 
falloff in the supply of oil. Interestingly, 
note that there is no sharp falloff in 
supply that helps explain the dramatic 
post-1999 increase in the price of oil. 
This suggests that the latest upward 
movement in the price of oil is a con-
26 Q1 2007Business Review www.philadelphiafed.org
8 See the two articles by James Hamilton. Ham-
ilton’s 2003 article contains many references 
to the literature on quantifying the effect of oil 
shocks on the U.S. economy. 
9 By external we mean events that are not 
caused by U.S. economic conditions. Econo-




Exogenous Oil Supply Shocks
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sequence of growth in demand for oil 
outpacing growth in supply.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
ON HOW MUCH OIL
SHOCKS MATTER
The evidence presented so far 
indicates that oil shocks, in the form 
of higher oil prices or reduced supplies 
of the quantity of oil, have a negative 
effect on U.S. real output growth. How 
strong is this negative relationship? We 
can use statistical analysis to estimate 
how much an increase in the price of 
oil caused by external factors reduces 
real output growth.
The effect of oil-price shocks 
caused by external factors on real 
output growth can be measured by 
running a statistical analysis (called a 
regression) of real output growth on 
lagged real output growth and lags 
of the net oil-price increase. The es-
timated regression is described more 
fully in Quantifying the Effect of Oil-
Price Shocks.  We can estimate this 
regression and get meaningful results 
because Hamilton's measure of net oil-
price increases has been shown to be 
a good proxy for changes in oil price 
caused by external factors.12 Thus, we 
don’t have to worry so much about 
feedback from the U.S. economy to the 
increase in net oil prices when inter-
preting the results.13
12 See, for example, the 2003 paper by James 
Hamilton and the 2006 paper by Lutz Kilian.
13 While oil prices spike prior to U.S. recessions, 
interest rates also spike prior to recessions. 
Thus, in their study, Ben Bernanke, Mark 
Gertler, and Mark Watson conjecture that it 
is really monetary policy responding to oil-
price shocks that causes recessions, since their 
model implies that an alternative policy could 
have greatly mitigated the effect of oil shocks. 
However, the article by James Hamilton and 
Ana Maria Herrera and my article with Sylvain 
Leduc argue that it is unlikely that alternative 
monetary policies would have completely 
avoided recessions in the face of the historical 
oil shocks that hit the U.S. economy. See also 
the Business Review article by Sylvain Leduc. 
Source: Author’s calculations
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Quantifying the Effects of Oil-Price Shocks
T
he dynamic effect of an exogenous oil shock on real output growth can be analyzed by running a 
regression of real output growth on its own lags and lags of the oil-shock measure.  A key to interpreting 
the regression is that the oil-shock measure is exogenous, which means it is not itself influenced by 
real output growth. To measure exogenous oil shocks, we use the measure of net oil-price increases 
discussed in the text. This measure is calculated as the greater of zero and the percentage difference of 
the current oil price from its previous 36-month peak. To measure real output growth, we use real GDP.  
The regression uses quarterly data and is estimated over the period 1948:4 to 2005:4. To capture the dynamics of the 
relationship, we included four lags of output growth and the net oil-price increase.  The regression takes the form:
yt EEyt-1Eyt-2+Eyt-3+Eyt-4+Eot-1+Eot-2+Eot-3+Eot-4
where yt is quarterly real GDP growth at time t and  ot is the net oil-price increase in quarter t.
The equation can be estimated by ordinary least squares.  The estimated coefficients, t-statistics, and probabilities 
that the coefficients are zero are:
The regression results indicate that the coefficients on the net oil-price increase are negative and statistically significant 
at lags two and four and that the maximal impact of the oil shock occurs at lag four (when using three decimal places). 
We can test whether the oil shocks have joint significance in the regression, which is a test of whether, statistically, we 
get just as good a fit if the oil shocks are dropped. When we test that hypothesis, it is strongly rejected, which means that 
oil-price increases have predictive power for real GDP growth. 
A similar regression of headline CPI inflation on the net oil-price increase gives the following estimates:
The coefficient estimates on the net oil-price increase variable are not significantly different from zero, which indicates 
that oil shocks are not helping to explain the path of inflation.  Indeed, a formal statistical test of whether the net oil-
price increase variable helps predict CPI inflation finds that it does not.
E E E E E E E E E
Estimate 0.01 0.25 0.10 -0.10 -0.12 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04
t-stat 7.54 3.74 1.39 -1.48 -1.90 -0.99 -2.20 -1.18 -2.41
Prob 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.32 0.03 0.23 0.01
E E E E E E E E E
Estimate 0.66 0.65 -0.02 0.39 -0.19 2.61 5.09 2.88 -4.64
t-stat 3.22 9.45 -0.37 5.17 -2.90 0.71 1.37 0.77 -1.25
Prob 0.00 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.17 0.44 0.21Business Review Q1 2007 29 www.philadelphiafed.org
The analysis indicates that the 
largest effect of an oil-price shock 
occurs about four quarters after the 
shock, indicating that it takes some 
time for the maximal effect of an oil 
shock to hit the economy. The implied 
path of an oil shock on real output 
growth can be calculated using an 
impulse response function. This type of 
graph shows how real output growth 
responds over time to a one-time 
increase in the price of oil caused by 
external factors. More specifically, this 
type of graph can tell us how much 
real output growth rises or falls over 
time in response to a temporary 10 
percent increase in the net price of oil 
that lasts only one period. In our case, 
we use quarterly data to estimate the 
regression and generate the impulse 
response. We can see how much real 
output growth is affected an arbitrary 
number of quarters in the future, given 
a one-quarter increase in the net price 
of oil today (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 shows that an increase 
in the net price of oil leads to a drop 
in real output growth that gradually 
increases over time until it reaches a 
maximum four quarters after the shock 
hits. After that, the growth rate of real 
output gradually recovers, so that after 
about three years, the effect of the oil 
shock has largely worn off and real 
output growth is back on its trend path 
(in the figure, the trend growth rate 
of real output has been removed). The 
impulse response function indicates 
that a 10 percent increase in the price 
of oil results in real output growth 
falling 0.55 percent at its maximum 
impact.  This translates into about a 
1.4 percent permanent reduction in 
the level of real output. Even a modest 
external increase in the net price of oil 
has a significant impact on real output, 
according to our analysis. 
A similar analysis can be per-
formed to investigate the effect of 
oil-price shocks on CPI inflation. The 
FIGURE 6
Real Output Response to Increase in Oil Prices
results from that regression are also 
reported in the box on page 28. In
this case, though, it turns out that 
oil-price shocks do not have a statisti-
cally significant effect on inflation. In
the context of our analysis, this means 
that a jump in oil prices does not help 
predict the path of future CPI infla-
tion. It appears then that net oil-price 
increases affect real output growth and 
not inflation. 
We can also examine how 
changes in the quantity of oil caused 
by external factors affect output 
growth and inflation using the data 
series put together by Lutz Kilian. 
Recall that Kilian developed a series 
of external shocks to oil quantity 
that measure supply disruptions in 
the Middle East.  Kilian's analysis 
indicates that a 10 percent decrease 
in the oil supply caused by external 
factors (which is about the magnitude 
of the disruptions documented in 
the table) leads to about a 2 percent 
drop in real GDP growth about five 
quarters after the shock hits. Kilian 
also investigated the effect of external 
oil-supply disruptions on CPI inflation. 
His analysis indicates that the effect 
on CPI inflation is negligible. Inflation 
is up only about 0.75 percent three 
quarters after the shock hits (which is 
the maximal impact of oil shocks on 
inflation).
  The data on both oil-price 
shocks and oil-quantity shocks give a 
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Percentthe economy after an oil shock that 
reduces supply and raises the price of 
oil. Real output declines steadily for 
several quarters, reaching a maximum 
decline about one year after the shock 
hits. Output then recovers gradually, 
and after a few years, the shock has 
largely worn off. Oil shocks appear 




Is the U.S. unique in its response 
to oil shocks, or do other developed 
countries display similar behavior?  A 
2005 working paper by Lutz Kilian ex-
amines this question using data on real 
output growth, inflation, and his series 
on external oil production shocks.  
The sample of countries investigated 
includes the United States, the United 
Kingdom, Japan, Germany, Italy, Can-
ada, and France.14
Using regressions similar to those 
reported in Quantifying the Effect of 
Oil-Price Shocks, Kilian finds a fair 
degree of similarity in the real output 
response of G7 countries to negative 
oil production shocks.  A 10 percent 
external disruption in oil supply typi-
cally leads to about a 2 percent reduc-
tion in real output growth that occurs 
between one and two years after the 
shock hits. The weakest response 
among the G7 countries is in Japan, 
but when the data are analyzed on the 
basis of cumulative inflation and real 
growth responses, Italy and France also 
have fared well historically when con-
fronted with oil supply shocks. 
For inflation, Kilian finds that oil 
supply disruptions do not lead to sus-
tained inflation in the G7 countries. 
There is some evidence for stagflation 
(a simultaneous rise in inflation and 
fall in real output growth) for the U.S., 
the U.K., and Italy.  There is no such 
evidence for stagflation in response 
to oil shocks for Germany, Japan, and 
Canada.  
Thus, the evidence from other 
developed countries is broadly similar 
to what we have described for the U.S.  
Oil shocks caused by external factors 
that lower supply and raise price do 
appear to have a negative effect on real 
output growth.  The evidence for oil 
shocks’ effects on inflation is more var-
ied, but it is largely consistent with the 
view that oil shocks do not have strong 
inflation effects.
Recent Developments. The prin-
cipal reason for recent increases in the 
price of oil is strong world demand as 
developing countries increase their 
oil consumption (Figure 7). What is 
striking about the figure is the recent 
strength in demand for oil coming 
from Asian countries. Principally, this 
demand growth is from China, India, 
and Indonesia. As these countries 
become wealthier, their demand for 
goods such as automobiles is rising, 
which leads to increased oil consump-
tion. Note as well that U.S. demand 
has been strong recently as the econo-
my has experienced strong real output 
growth.  
Interestingly enough, strong de-
mand for oil from regions of the world 
such as Asia can, from the perspective 
of the U.S., look very similar to an oil-
price shock. To the extent that trade 
ties between the U.S. and Asia are 
weak, strong growth or weak growth 
in the U.S. may have little effect on 
economic growth in Asia.  Conse-
quently, Asian demand for oil that 
boosts the worldwide price of oil, and 
hence the price the U.S. pays for oil, 
is external to U.S. economic condi-
tions and so may be no different from a 
conflict in the Middle East that results 
in a higher price for oil. In the case 
of the post-1999 oil-price increases, 
though, the rise in price has been fairly 
gradual compared with the external 
price increases we have talked about. 
Consumers and firms have had time to 
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adjust to the price increase and, given 
the strength of the U.S. economy, cer-
tainly part of the oil-price increase has 
been due to strong U.S. demand for oil. 
As a consequence, the effect on the 
economy of the most recent rise in the 
price of oil may not be as strong as pre-
dicted based on the periods of Middle 
East crises.
Nonetheless, we can conduct a 
back-of-the-envelope simulation using 
the estimated relationship between 
real output and net oil-price increases 
that generated the impulse responses 
in Figure 6.  If we simulate the model 
using the net oil-price increases that 
occurred between 2004Q1 through 
2006Q2, the prediction is that the 
level of real GDP (holding all else con-
stant) is currently about 3.2 percent 
lower than what it would have been 
had there been no oil shocks over that 
period.  
CONCLUSION
Historically, the U.S. economy 
has tended to perform poorly follow-
ing major disruptions in the supply of 
oil that coincide with large increases 
in the price of oil.  Typically, these 
disruptions have been associated with 
conflicts in the Middle East that sig-
nificantly affected the world supply of 
oil.  The nature of these conflicts is 
that they are external to developments 
in the U.S. economy.  Consequently, 
these episodes provide evidence that 
oil-price increases may directly cause 
slower real output growth, both for the 
U.S. and for the other major industrial 
countries.  
The empirical evidence suggests 
that a 10 percent increase in the price 
of oil is associated with about a 1.4 per-
cent drop in the level of U.S. real GDP. 
Interestingly, increases in oil prices 
have no significant effect on U.S. in-
flation, a finding that largely holds up 
when we look at the major industrial 
economies.  
Since 1999, there has been a dra-
matic increase in the world price of oil.  
The evidence suggests that this in-
crease is driven not so much by supply 
disruptions as by strong demand from 
the U.S., Western Europe, and Asia, 
especially China, India, and Indonesia.  
From the perspective of the U.S., some 
of this price increase is tantamount 
to an external oil shock.  However, 
because the rise in price has been 
gradual and has occurred in the face of 
strong growth, the U.S. economy has 
not experienced an oil-induced reces-
sion. Nevertheless, the evidence sug-
gests that the recent rise in oil prices 
has worked to restrain domestic output 
growth.    
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